To test several alternative models of verbal communication in schizophrenia, 24 schizophrenic and 24 normal speakers were shown sets of colors varying in similarity and number of colors displayed. The task was to describe a designated color in each set so that a listener could pick it out. Disturbances in schizophrenic speakers were shown to occur whenever the task demanded that they edit out nondiscriminating descriptions. Thus, for highly dissimilar sets where the self-editing demands are minimal, the communication accuracy, reaction time, and utterance length of schizophrenics and normals were indistinguishable. But with increasing intraset similarity the schizophrenics' communication accuracy dropped below the normals, while their reaction time and utterance length rose more sharply. Qualitative and quantitative features of disturbed schizophrenic communication were described in terms of a perseverative-chaining model of speaker behavior in schizophrenia.
The present investigation extends this line of inquiry using a continuous discourse task that permits a more detailed analysis of the communication disturbance than was possible in the Cohen and Camhi (1967) study in which speakers' utterances were limited to single "clue words." Several alternative hypotheses concerning the schizophrenic speaker deficit were formulated, each in terms of a basic two-stage model of normal speaker behavior proposed originally by Cohen (1964, 1966) . The results of the present investigation were used to evaluate these alternative hypotheses. The results also bear on the validity of the basic two-stage model itself.
The Rosenberg-Cohen model deals with experimental situations in which a speaker, shown an explicit set of objects, is instructed to describe one of the objects (the referent) such that a listener could pick it out of the set on the basis of the description. According to the model, the speaker's referential process is a concatenation of two hypothetical psychological stages: sampling and comparison. Both stages are assumed to be probabilistic. That is, the process begins with a sampling stage in which a name or description is randomly drawn from the speaker's repertoire of linguistic units associated with 1 the referent. The probability of any given unit being sampled is proportional to its associative strength (or descriptive strength) to the referent, alone. For any given referent, it is assumed that the speaker's repertoire contains a number of such names or descriptions, each of which may be more or less adequate as a linguistic clue for the listener. In the comparison (self-editing) stage, which follows sampling, the relative associative strength of the sampled response to referent and nonreferent objects determines the probability with which the speaker will emit or reject it. If, as a result of the comparison stage, the sampled response is rejected as an inadequate communication because its associative strength to a nonreferent is similar to or actually larger than its associative strength to the referent, the sampling-comparison cycle is repeated. Ultimately the speaker emits a response, thus terminating the process. The following is a diagrammatic representation of this hypothetical two-stage process. REFERENT One can think of the speaker's comparison stage as one in which the speaker implicitly takes the role of listener in order to "test" the adequacy of a sampled response before emitting (or rejecting) it. A self-editing function of this type is reminiscent of Sullivan's (1946) conception of the "fantastic auditor" and Mead's (1934) conception of the "generalized other" in their theorizing about schizophrenic and normal communication. The function of this type of mechanism is to edit out utterances the speaker judges to be inappropriate as communications before they intrude into overt speech. We regard Mead's and Sullivan's ideas as early adumbrations of a number of more recent information processing models, stemming principally from Broadbent (1958) , that have been used to explain the failure of schizophrenic patients to screen out task-irrelevant stimuli or responses (e.g., Cromwell & Dokecki, 1968; McGhie & Chapman, 1961; Payne, Matusek, & George, 1959; Shakow, 1962; Yates, 1966) .
In the present investigation, sets of Munsell colors (Farnsworth, 1957) varying in hue similarity and in set size (number of colors) were displayed to speakers who were instructed to describe a designated color (the referent) in each set so that a listener could pick it out of the display, given the speaker's description. The communication accuracy of any given description is measured in terms of the success with which listeners actually do so.
Since colors similar in hue tend to evoke the same name (Brown & Lenneberg, 1954) , the two-stage model would lead one to expect the common color names (those with highest sampling probability) to be rejected in the self-editing stage when the display consists of highly similar referent and nonreferent colors. The name the speaker ultimately emits will tend instead to be a more discriminating description sampled from the low-frequency end of the distribution of descriptions of that color. Because unusual descriptions often consist of compound names, qualifiers and color combinations, these utterances tend to be longer than the common responses, for example, "late-autumn-leaf red turning brown" compared to "red." In contrast, when the display consists of dissimilar hues, the applicability of the referent's common color name to the nonreferents will be low; hence, the short, common description, for example, "red," will pass the self-editing stage with high probability and be emitted (Krauss & Weinheimer, 1967) .
The two-stage model can also yield a prediction concerning the influence of display similarity on reaction time: the time to initiate an overt description. A speaker who is considering a referent color in a dissimilar display is likely to sample an effective name without having to recycle through the twostage process. When the display consists of similar colors, however, the speaker will probably recycle a number of times before sampling a name or description adequate to "pass" the self-editing stage test. Each recycling presumably takes time; hence, reaction time will be longer for similar than for dissimilar displays.
Display size (the number of objects) is another parameter of interest for tests of the two-stage model, alone or in combination with display similarity. It is fairly straightforward to predict, on the basis of the model, (a) increases in utterance length and reaction time with increases in the number of nonreferents a speaker considers when comparing the relative applicability of a sampled description to each of the colors in a display and (b) that these effects of display size will be more pronounced for similar than dissimilar displays. The short, popular, readily sampled color names will probably be applicable to a referent in a dissimilar display regardless of how many nonreferents are included; but in a similar display the larger the number of nonreferents the more heavily qualified-and hence the longer-the description if the speaker intends to prevent confusion of the referent with each of the several nonreferents in the display.
The literature on the linguistic codability of colors indicates that normal speakers, motivated to maintain a high level of communication accuracy, will alter their descriptions of a referent color as changes are introduced in the similarity and size of the display (Lantz & Stefflre, 1964) . As outlined above, this alteration can be thought of as depending on the two-stage process postulated by Rosenberg and Cohen for normal speakers.
Can the disturbance of language in schizophrenics be "localized" in one or the other component of the two-stage process? The present investigation was designed with this general question in mind. In what follows, three special hypotheses are outlined to account for the schizophrenic speaker deficit. These hypotheses entail different predictions concerning how schizophrenic referent descriptions will deviate from those of normal speakers under varying contextual display conditions.
The Tower of Babel Model
According to this hypothesis, a schizophrenic engages in the same formal samplingand-comparison activity as a normal speaker, but samples from an idiosyncratic repertoire and bases his comparison stage judgments on correspondingly deviant associative strengths. If this hypothesis is correct, schizophrenic speakers will show the same context-produced alterations in reaction time and utterance length as normals, but communication accuracy will be generally poorer at all levels of display similarity and size.
The Babel model is related to Sullivan's (1946) notion that schizophrenic speech lacks "consensual validity" insofar as the patient does not pretest his utterances against a socially representative "fantastic auditor" prior to their overt expression to actual listeners. The "fantastic auditor" functions for normals as an internal representation of cultural referent-response norms. If the schizophrenic tests his utterances instead against idiosyncratic norms, he may operate according to the same two-stage response selection process as normals, but his responses will nevertheless fail to communicate accurately to other persons. It would be akin to speaking a linguistically competent but alien tongue.
According to The Tower of Babel model, however, the schizophrenic's message ought to be meaningful to himself. That is, if communication were measured in terms of the accuracy with which a schizophrenic patient picks out referents on the basis of his own speaker-role descriptions, his scores should be no different from those of a normal when the normal is required to respond as a listener to his (the normal's) own speaker-role descriptions.
The Impulsive Speaker Model
According to this hypothesis, the schizophrenic's descriptions are based exclusively on the sampling stage: the model assumes that the patient samples (normally) from a nondeviant repertoire but fails to self-edit prior to overt communication. In Sullivan's terms, the schizophrenic speaker is construed as lacking (or failing to use) a fantastic auditor, altogether. The hypothesis of an absent comparison stage leads to the prediction that no context effects will occur for schizophrenic speakers. Reaction time and utterance length will be determined by the referent color alone; hence, no changes in these variables are expected with changes in similarity or size of the display. In contrast, communication accuracy (to self or other) is expected to deteriorate sharply with increasing similarity and size of the display, relative to the accuracy levels achieved by normal speakers. This model is similar to one proposed by Smith (1970) for verbal communication in chronic schizophrenia.
The Perseverative Speaker Model
According to this model, the schizophrenic speaker samples from a nondeviant repertoire and engages in normal comparison-stage activity but continually resamples the same response after rejecting it as inadequate. This notion is related to one proposed by Cromwell and Dokecki (1968) , who viewed the schizophrenic as deficient in the ability to "disattend from" a stimulus after having attended to it. In the present context, this is analogous to a speaker's inability to ignore a sampled response after deciding that it is inappropriate. In other words, the patient's fantastic auditor is construed here as active and accurate but impotent.
The perseverative model leads to the same predictions as the impulsive model with respect to communication accuracy. Also, since the schizophrenic speaker is construed as repeatedly resampling the same inadequate description until it ultimately "passes" the probabilistic self-editing stage and is emitted, the perseverative model predicts no change in utterance length with changes in display context. In contrast, the perseverative model departs sharply from the impulsive model with respect to reaction time: according to the perseverative model, schizophrenic speakers will show increments in reaction time with increments in display similarity and size.
METHOD

Stimulus Materials
Stimulus items were selected from the 85 colors in the Farnsworth-Munsell 100-Hue Test. The colors are distributed over the whole circular hue spectrum with brightness and saturation held constant. They are assigned Farnsworth-Munsell numbers such that each color is one just noticeable difference away from its neighbor. Thus, Colors 8 and 11, for example, are three "hue steps" apart, 3 as are Colors 55 and 58, and 85 and 3 (85 is the highest number in this circular series). The color numbers and their corresponding approximate hues are as follows: 
Farnsworth-Munsell Numbers Approximate Hues
Experimental Design
The colors, in the form of discs, were presented in displays that varied in two ways: number of discs in the display (display size) and number of hue steps between "neighboring" discs in the display (display similarity). There were two different display sizes (2 and 4) and four levels of similarity (2-, 4-, 8-, and 12-hue steps). Also, there were 2 different displays at each level of similarity for each display size, making 16 separate displays. Every disc served once as the referent in its display: accordingly, the eight 2-disc displays were each presented twice and the eight 4-disc displays, four times. Thus, each speaker provided a total of 48 descriptions.
Subjects
Twenty-four acute first-admission male schizophrenic patients and 24 male nonpatient control 3 For convenience in exposition, we refer to the distance between two adjacent discs as a "hue step." This is not the conventional use of the term "hue step" (Farnsworth, 19S7) . subjects served as speakers. The patients' average age was 25.7 years (SD = 5.8) with an average educational level of 13.1 years (5.0 = 2.3). The average age of the control subjects, all volunteer medical center employees, was 24.0 years (SD = S.8) with an educational level of 13.1 years ).
An additional group of 24 staff personnel from the medical center served as a listener panel to measure the communication accuracy of the speakers' descriptions. Their average age was 26.9 years (SZ> = 5.0) with an educational level of 12.9 years (SZ> = 2.8).
The schizophrenics were initially diagnosed by a psychiatrist or psychologist on intake duty at a mental health clinic affiliated with a general medical center in the Greater New York area. The diagnosis was later checked by three other professionals (two psychiatrists and a psychologist) at a treatment planning conference for the patient. A schizophrenic was selected as a subject if all three conference members confirmed the initial diagnosis of schizophrenia and agreed that the patient manifested (a) symptoms of language and thought disorder and (6) a predominantly nonparanoid symptom picture.
None of the subjects was taking psychotropic medication during the period of their participation in this study. All subjects were screened for color blindness using the Ishihara test (1967). One normal subject was excluded from the study (and replaced by another normal) because of an inflammation of the eyelid which he felt impaired his visual acuity.
Procedure
Speaker task. Each speaker was individually tested. He was told that when a display was presented he was to describe the particular color indicated by the experimenter, "so that another person with the same colors in front of him will know just which • color you are talking about." The speaker was also told that the positioning of the color discs in the display would not be the same for the listener.
Each display, covered, was placed before the subject and then uncovered while the experimenter pointed to the referent. The discs were displayed on a flat-gray mat, 2 feet X 3 feet, illuminated by a General Electric standard daylight lamp.
The subject's description was tape recorded and his reaction time, the interval between the uncovering of the display and the beginning of his description, was measured to the nearest second by stopwatch. The 48 displays were presented in random order with the restriction that the same display, with a different referent, was never presented consecutively.
Listener panel. A measure of communication accuracy was obtained from the 24 normal volunteers who had not served as speakers. Their task was to pick out the referent colors on the basis of the speakers' descriptions. The listeners worked in groups of four, each listener seated at one of the four corners of a table. Sets of colors that had previously been shown to the speakers were displayed one at a time. The colors were numbered 1 and 2 for the 2-disc displays and 1, 2, 3 and 4 for the 4-disc displays. Each listener independently recorded the number of the color he judged to be the referent upon listening to a playback of the speaker's description.
One description was randomly selected from each of the eight experimental conditions from the protocols of each of the 48 speakers. These 384 (8 X 48) descriptions were assigned to the listeners as follows. Each listener was given eight descriptions from 24 speakers, 12 schizophrenics and 12 normals. Thus, each listener made a total of 192 referent choices.
Speakers in the role of listeners. After an interval of seven days from the time the subject had served as speaker, he returned to serve as a listener for his own speaker-role descriptions. Each subject listened to one description randomly selected from each of the 8 experimental conditions (2 display sizes X 4 levels of similarity). The particular display was placed before the subject and a tape recording of his own description of one of the discs in the display played back to him. He was instructed to point to the referent disc after listening to his description of it. The subject was informed that the playback was his own response to the display, recorded at the previous session.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Communication Accuracy
The three conflicting models described in the introductory section are all attempts to account for the schizophrenic speakers' poor communication accuracy. Before examining the findings that support or refute each of the three models, we present the results of the communication accuracy measure obtained from the listener panel. For any given description, this measure was denned as the proportion of listeners who correctly identified the referent. The findings are presented in Figure 1 .
Inspection of the Figure shows that both speaker groups communicated less accurately as the similarity between colors in a display increased. Also, the drop in accuracy for both display size conditions was considerably steeper for the schizophrenic speakers who at Level 1 achieved near-perfect accuracy but at Level 4 failed to exceed chance: .SO and .25 for the two-and four-disc displays, respectively.
Also apparent in Figure 1 is the effect of display size for both groups. Unlike the simi- larity effect, the effect of display size was apparently no more marked in the schizophrenic than in the normal group, possibly because of a floor effect (the chance level) that limited the extent to which the schizophrenic group could drop below the normal in the four-disc condition. In sum, the communication accuracy findings show that the schizophrenics were less effective speakers than the normals overall, but the two groups were indistinguishable when display similarity was minimal. The schizophrenic deficit is apparently dependent upon the self-editing requirements of the display: the higher the similarity, the larger the resulting deficit. 
The Tower of Babel Model
It will be recalled that this model assumes normal functioning of the two-stage speaker process but with the individual patient sampling from his private repertoire. A strong case could be made for this model if, in contrast to the impaired communication accuracy scores found when the listener panel was used, the self-accuracy scores of the patients were equal to those of the normals. The findings, however, failed to confirm this prediction. The relevant data are presented in Figure 2 .
Inspection of Figure 2 reveals that the selfaccuracy findings were comparable to those obtained from the listener panel: The schizophrenics were generally poorer than the normals; and, while both groups showed drops in self-accuracy with increases in display similarity and size, the similarity effect (slope) was clearly more pronounced for the schizophrenics. Thus, the results indicate that schizophrenics are less able to interpret their own individual utterances. These self-accuracy trends were borne out by the analysis of variance presented in the appropriate columns of Table 1 . Cohen and Camhi (1967) , using a singleword communication task, found schizophrenic listeners to be no more (nor less) able to interpret the speaker responses of othe: schizophrenics than were normal listeners Indeed, schizophrenic listeners, similar to nor mal listeners, were less able to interpre schizophrenic than normal speakers' responses To generalize: the accumulated evidence sug gests not only that schizophrenics, as a group do not share a special language but also tha the individual patient does not have an au tistic language of his own. This conclusion is consistent with that of a number of investi gators whose findings indicate that schizo phrenics' associative repertoires are essen tially nondeviant even though their over verbalizations may often be unusual or ever bizarre (Fuller & Kates, 1969; Johnson Weiss, & Zelhart, 1964; Lisman & Cohen 1972; Smith, 1970; Sommer, Dewar, & Os mond, 1960) .
Before abandoning the Tower of Babe model altogether, it may be useful to make i more direct comparison of the discrepancies between accuracy scores based on the listene panel and scores based on the speaker as hii own listener. Visual comparison of Figure  1 and 2 shows the self-accuracy values foi both speaker groups to be generally highei than those from the listener panel. However the discrepancies (self-accuracy minus inde pendent listener accuracy) are mostly highe: for the schizophrenics than the normals. These discrepancies are presented directly in Figure 3 . An analysis of variance was performed combining the mean proportion self-accuracy values and the mean proportion listener-panel values into one design. The analysis showed the self-accuracy proportions to be significantly higher than the listener-panel proportions (F = 73.5, df= 1/8, p < .001), suggesting that speakers enjoy some "autistic advantage" when choosing referents on the basis of their own speaker-role descriptions. This finding is consistent with a report by Krauss, Vivekananthan, and Weinheimer (1968) , who found that normal listeners were more accurate when choosing colors on the basis of their own than other persons' descriptions.
Of special importance for the Tower of Babel model is the significant Speaker Groups X Listener Conditions interaction (F = 64.0, df=\/4, p<.0l) . This confirms the impression given by Figure 3 that the schizophrenics' autistic advantage was indeed larger than the normals' thus implying some possible degree of validity for the Tower of Babel model. However, before reaching such a conclusion, we considered an alternative account of this finding, an account that implicates a memory factor in place of the private language assumption intrinsic to the Tower of Babel model.
According to the memory hypothesis, the ability to identify a referent on the basis of a subject's own previous description of it is facilitated by his recall of the association between referent and description during the speaker task, a source of information which speakers have when they serve as their own listeners but which other listeners do not have. If the normal speakers' communications were more discriminatory of their referents to begin with, as indicated by the listener panel data, they would have less need than the schizophrenics to rely on the memory factor when placed in the listener role vis-a-vis their own speaker-role descriptions; hence, the normals' autistic advantage scores would be lower than the schizophrenics'.
This form of autism is exemplified by the following schizophrenic speaker's response to a Level 2 referent: "From colors you don't know. The man downstairs has a tie just this color. Go look." At the time he offered this description the patient apparently knew both the referent and the object with which he verbally compared it and might well recall both later. Another person, however, would have to find the man downstairs or be left in the referential dark.
We are inclined to favor the memory hypothesis in view of the configuration of both sets of curves shown in Figure 3 : For the most dissimilar displays (Level 1) both groups were already at ceiling communication accuracy (listener panel); hence, little or no additional memory-induced benefit could accrue to self-accuracy. At the opposite extreme (Level 4) the beneficial effects of memory would also be limited to the extent that the similarity between colors in a display was high enough to interfere with perception of which color was, in fact, the referent. In contrast, the middle levels of similarity should include a region where the displays are neither so dissimilar that memory is superfluous nor so similar as to interfere with its operation. The peak autistic advantage shown by the patients at Level 2 is consistent with this implication of the memory hypothesis and does not seem to be explicable by the Tower of Babel model.
The Impulsive Speaker Model
As given earlier, this account of the schizophrenic speaker deficit assumes a normal sampling stage and a nondeviant repertoire but no self-editing stage. This model is entirely consistent with the communication accuracy findings (self or listener panel). If a speaker samples the most probable descriptions (the common color names) and emits these with no self-editing, he will show high accuracy on the low similarity displays and progressively lower accuracy as similarity increases. This is because, with increasing similarity, the common color name also describes the nonreferent(s), thus leading to a form of schizophrenic overinclusion.
Failure to self-edit also implies that reaction time and utterance length will not vary with alterations in either display similarity or display size. However, the findings clearly disconfirmed these predictions. Indeed, the findings for reaction time given in Figure 4 are actually the reverse: the schizophrenics were more sensitive than the normals to variations in display similarity and size. It is apparent that the schizophrenics were slower, overall, than the normals and that the similarity effect was sharper for the schizophrenic group in both conditions of display size, but more so for the four-disc displays. All of these effects for reaction time are statistically significant as shown in Table 1 .
According to the impulsive speaker model, utterance length should also show no change with alterations in display similarity or size. However, Figure 5 shows that the utterance lengths of the schizophrenics were system- atically influenced by display similarity, display size and their interaction. Moreover, the schizophrenics had, overall, larger utterance lengths than the normals, showing little difference from the normals at Level 1 but progressively larger differences with each increment in similarity. The effect of display size, however, does not appear to be more pronounced in the schizophrenic group. The analysis of variance for utterance length (Table 1) indicates a significant overall difference between groups (p < .01) and a significant Group X Similarity interaction (p < .01), but interactions with display size are nonsignificant. If one regards the similarity-induced increments in reaction time and utterance length as indicators of self-editing activity, the findings suggest that the schizophrenic speakers were engaging in more self-editing activity than the normals, even though this did not yield commensurate increments in communication accuracy. It appears that though the schizophrenics tried harder than the normals to communicate accurately, they achieved less for it.
The Perseverative Speaker Model
The essential feature of this model is the speaker's inability to ignore a rejected response despite his recognition of its poor quality as a communication. Unable to sample a fresh description of the referent, the schizophrenic speaker is assumed to resample the same inappropriate response until, ultimately, it passes the probabilistic self-editing stage and is emitted. In common with the impulsive model, the perseverative model calls for the observed decrements in communication accuracy (self or others as listeners) with increasing display similarity and size. In contrast to the impulsive model, the perseverative model calls for increases in reaction time with increases in display similarity and sizepredictions that were strongly confirmed by the data in Figure 4 .
However, since the response initially sampled will be the one ultimately emitted, the perseverative model also predicts no changes in utterance length with variations in display similarity or size-predictions that were clearly disconfirmed by the data in Figure S . In fact, the schizophrenics showed abnormally large increments in utterance length with increases in display similarity.
Before proposing a modification of the perseverative speaker model to accommodate the utterance length findings, it will be instructive to examine some examples of normal and schizophrenic speaker responses. The following descriptions were typical of those obtained under conditions in which the demands on the speaker's self-editing stage were minimal-a two-disc Level 1 display in which the referent, a purple blue, was 12 FarnsworthMunsell hue steps distant from a red nonreferent: The appropriateness of these schizophrenic responses and their obvious comparability with the normal responses is consistent with either the impulsive or perseverative models. That is, either model predicts that the most probable response will be the common color name which is also easily sufficient for effective communication in this low-similarity (Level 1) situation.
In contrast, the following examples, taken from the protocols of the same normal and schizophrenic speakers, were typical of those obtained under conditions in which the selfediting demands were much more rigorous-a Level 4 display of a red referent and a highly similar, slightly more yellow, nonreferent two hue steps distant:
Normal Speaker 1: "Both are salmon colored. This one, however, has more pink." Normal Speaker 2: "My God this is hard. They are both about the same except that this one might be a little redder." Normal Speaker 3: "They both are either the color of canned salmon or clay. This one here is the pinker one." Schizophrenic Speaker 1: "A fish swims. You call it a salmon. You cook it. You put it in a can. You open the can. You look at it in this color. Salmon fish." Schizophrenic Speaker 2: "This is the stupid color of a shit ass bowl of salmon. Mix it with mayonnaise. Then it gets tasty. Leave it alone and puke all over the fuckin' place. Puke fish." Schizophrenic Speaker 3: "Make-up. Pancake makeup. You put it on your face and they think guys run after you. Wait a second! I don't put it on my face and guys don't run after me. Girls put it on them."
It is apparent that the normals, after initially expressing many of the same descrip-tive concepts as the schizophrenics, for example, "salmon," explicitly note their overinclusive character and then shift to other more discriminating features of the referent, ". . . more pink," "... a little redder" and the entire utterance retains the character of an integrated description. Although the initial components of the schizophrenic speakers' utterances also appear to consist of common descriptive responses to the referent, later components appear to be drawn instead from associations to each just prior response resulting in a chain of loosely connected elements rather than a coherent description. In the following section, we propose a modification of the perseverative speaker model that is consistent with these qualitative features of the patients' attempts at description as well as with the quantitative results presented earlier.
The Perseverative-Chaining Model
This model is identical with the perseverative model but with the addition of a twostage chaining process that begins after the perseverative, but ineffective, response has been emitted. In the chaining process it is assumed that the speaker (a) samples each new response from his repertoire of associations to the immediately preceding response rather than to the referent, (b) says aloud each sampled-but-rejected response, and (c) continues these attempts at description until a response passes the probabilistic self-editing stage and the patient stops talking.
The chaining process can also include instances of perseveration of overt responses which is a special form of chaining. The following two examples illustrate this type of chaining. The first was a patient's response to a yellow-red referent in a high similarity (Level 4) display:
Shit, shit, shit, shit, shit. All we do turns to shit. You're a shit. Shit, shit, shit. When we shit less, and this one has the least shit in it. So you don't have to do too much.
The second example, a response to a green referent in a Level 3 display, illustrates perseveration combined with clang:
Green 1 Hold on, the other is too! In the garden such a green is unlikely. Too synthetic! The other is more gardenreal [given as a single word], piecemeal, oatmeal green, greenreal, filmreal, greenreal.
The implicit perseverative responses account for the increased reaction times of the schizophrenic speakers, while the overt chaining responses account for the exaggerated utterance lengths shown by the patients under conditions requiring high degrees of self-editing. The key assumption of the perseverative process is the schizophrenic's inability to reject a sampled response. As pointed out earlier, this is analagous to the "disattention deficit" posited by Cromwell and Dokecki (1968) . The key assumption of the chaining process is that each successive overt component of a schizophrenic utterance is sampled from the patient's repertoire of associations to the just prior response rather than to the referent. This assumption is consistent with Salzinger's (1971) "immediacy hypothesis" which implies that compared to normal speech, a given verbal response extracted from a schizophrenic speaker's discourse will be related primarily to its immediately neighboring segments rather than to more remote portions of the text.
Other investigators have observed perseverative or pathological chaining tendencies in schizophrenia in concept formation tasks (Rapaport, 1946; Vigotsky, 1934) , written documents (Maher, McKean, & McLaughlin, 1966) , and continuous word association (Mednick & Shulsinger, 1970) . What is unique to the present investigation is the discovery oj the specific conditions that give rise to these schizophrenic disturbances in communication: They occur whenever the communication task demands oj the speaker that he edit out a sampled response. In the present experimental situation, the disturbances occurred whenever the task required the speaker to edit out common associations or meanings in the description of a referent. When the common response was adequate, schizophrenic and normal communication were indistinguishable. By extension, whenever a schizophrenic samples a response he perceives to be ineffective or threatening in his everyday transactions, he is unable to edit it out and, as a consequence, manifests the same kinds of language disturbance observed in the present study.
The role attributed to common associations, meanings, or descriptions in schizophrenic language and thought is consistent with the findings and interpretations of Chapman and his associates (Chapman, 1958; Chapman, Chapman, & Miller, 1964) . The present probabilistic conception, however, implies that whatever response the patient initially samples, whether common or otherwise, will tend to impede further sampling of fresh and possibly more effective responses to the referent.
The present findings might be specific to early, acute nonparanoid schizophrenia. The evidence of perseverative and chaining tendencies could represent a part of the psychopathology of the early stages of the disorder during which there is a futile but still persisting struggle to communicate adequately. Referent communication in later stages of schizophrenia might be better described by the impulsive speaker model in that such patients are more likely to express, without further attempts at self-editing, sampled but inappropriate responses once they sense the futility of their attempts to reject them (Kantorowicz, 1974; Lisman & Cohen, 1972) . Finally, Kantorowicz, in a study of long-term schizophrenics, showed that paranoid patients were more terse than nonparanoids in their referent descriptions. Thus, it is possible that the chaining tendencies found among the acute nonparanoid patients of the present study might be less in evidence with a paranoid sample.
